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JURISDICTION & NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth District 
Court in Utah County related to a refusal of the trial court to 
enforce a stipulation and order of the Court entered and filed more 
than five (5) years before. The refusal to enforce the stipulation 
occurred when it was to be performed which was in July 1992. The 
trial court was of the opinion that the stipulation was illegal and 
thus unenforceable, notwithstanding that the stipulation was 
approved by the Court. (Record 551-548) 
The Court of Appeals has appellant jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)(h). Notice of Appeal was filed 
with the trial court on December 14, 1992. (Record 559) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal addresses the following issues: 
1. Is the stipulation at issue illegal? 
Standard of Review: See below. 
2. Even if the stipulation is illegal, should the District 
Court enforce the stipulation and order since it was made more than 
five (5) years ago? 
Standard of Review: See below 
3. If the stipulation is invalid, should the Court revise 
or modify the stipulation to insure justice? 
Standard of Review: See below 
4. Should Defendant be awarded costs and attorney's fees? 
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Standard of Review: See below 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The first three (3) issues have the same standard of review. 
A motion on the pleadings is reviewed as a motion for summary 
judgment and the standard for review is that the facts are to be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the party against whom judgment 
was granted with all reasonable inference from the facts in favor 
of the non-prevailing party. Review is de novo with no deference 
to the findings or ruling of the trial court. Wincreqar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) and Daniel v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, , 771 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct App. 1989) cert denied 783 P.2d 
53. 
The standard of review on the issue of attorney's fees is a 
matter of discretion with this court under Utah Code Title 30. 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
Both state and federal statutes are involved in this case. 
Copies of the following statutes and regulations are found in the 
addendum to this brief: 
20 C.F.R. §404.2035 and 2040 
Utah R. Civil P. 60(b) 
Utah Code §78-45-4 is cited and states: 
"Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support 
her husband when he is in need." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties to this appeal were divorced July 18, 1985, by 
stipulation and without a trial. (Record 403-410) On January 7, 
1987, a modification of the original decree was ordered based on 
a second stipulation between the parties drafted by Plaintiff's 
attorney and approved by the Court, but for some reason not 
approved as to form by Defendant's attorney. (Record 469-473) In 
July 1992, Defendant complied with his part of the stipulation, but 
Plaintiff refused. (Record 477) 
Defendant brought an order to show cause to enforce the 
Court's order and the stipulation. (Record 479) Plaintiff plead 
that the stipulation and order were illegal (Record 482-484) and 
the Court refused to enforce either. (Record 504-506) The Court 
Commissioner struck the order to show cause. 
Defendant objected and moved the Court to enforce the 
stipulation. (Record 500-501) The trial judge affirmed the 
commissioner, refused to enforce its order and refused to decide 
other issues related to the stipulation and modification on the 
grounds that the issues were not before the court. (Record 548-541 
and Addendum) 
In the January 7, 1987, order, the court required Defendant 
to retire on social security retirement at the age of 62 so that 
Plaintiff could receive social security for the children at a rate 
higher than Defendant was required to pay under the Child Support 
U 
Guidelines. If Defendant did not retire at age 62, he was required 
to place sufficient money into an interest bearing trust account 
to equal $10,000 in 1999, which was to be paid to Plaintiff in 
1999. (Record 469-463) 
The Social security benefits are sufficient to pay both 
Plaintiff and Defendant's support obligations under the Utah State 
Support Guidelines. (Record 509-516) 
If Defendant retired at age 62, Plaintiff was ordered to place 
the social security into an interest bearing trust account and 
withdraw each month only an amount equal to Defendant's court 
ordered support. The balance of the funds were to be left to 
accumulate interest until the funds had a present value equal to 
$10,000 in 1999 dollars. When this value was reached, Plaintiff 
was to be allowed to removed $10,000 with any access to be paid to 
Defendant. Plaintiff was relieved of her support obligation under 
this arrangement. (Record 469-473) 
Defendant complied with the Court's order and retired on 
social security at age 62 in July 1992, however, Plaintiff refused 
to comply with the agreement and Court order and took the position 
that she had been informed by the Social Security Administration 
that the stipulation was illegal since the social security benefit 
for the minor children was being utilized to pay property 
obligation of the parents. (Record 527-532) 
Defendant requested the Court to either require Plaintiff to 
5 
comply with the Court's order or to enter an order that would deem 
the $10,000 obligation discharged. (Record 489-490) The trial 
court simply refused to do either and informed the parties that 
they could re-litigate these issues. (Record 504-506) 
PROVISION INVOLVED 
The provision of the stipulation and order which is at issue 
in this appeal is contained in the Addendum to this brief in the 
document entitled Order to Modify Decree of Divorce at pages 2 and 
3 and in paragraph 3(c)(1-6). 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
The Honorable Judge Lynn Davis issued a written ruling in this 
matter in which he sustained the decision of the court 
commissioner. A copy of the ruling is included in the Addendum and 
is found in the record at pages 548 through 551, but is not 
reproduced in the brief since the Court of Appeals must review this 
matter de novo with no deference to the decisions of the trial 
court. See Wingegar v. Froerer Corp., supra, and Daniel v. Deseret 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The trial court refused to enforce its order of January 7, 
1987, struck a portion of its 1987 order and directed that the 
parties re-litigate certain issues. (Record 504-506) The Court 
Commissioner's order stated in pertinent part: 
"8. Paragraph 3c(l) of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce 
dated January 7, 1987, is hereby stricken. 
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9. Any further modification of the Order to Modify Decree 
of Divorce with regard to the payment provisions of the 
$10,000.00 obligation set forth in paragraph 3c must be 
agreed to by the parties or re-litigated." 
In fact, the trial court was of the opinion that certain 
issues related to equitable relief was not before it and refused 
to take any action. (Record 548-551 and Addendum). Since this 
appeal addresses legal issues and not the equitable issues of 
whether or not the 1987 agreement should be modified at this time 
in equity, a petition to modify was filed in the trial court after 
the filing of this appeal so that facts could be obtained through 
discovery. (Record 562-566) 
The petition has not be set for trial and the trial court has 
entered an order that reserves whether or not the petition to 
modify should be stayed pending decision of this court. A copy of 
this order is also found in the Addendum to this brief, but is not 
a part of the record since the record was certified prior to entry 
of the order. (See index filed February 17, 1993) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's argument is that the stipulation of the parties 
in 1987 which was approved by the Court should be enforced at this 
time because of justifiable reliance on the trial court's order by 
the Appellant and because if Appellee intended to seek relief from 
the stipulation, she had to do so within three (3) months of its 
entry on January 7, 1987. Finally, Appellant argues that the 
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stipulation was not illegal when entered and that justice now 
requires its enforcement. 
ANALYSIS/DETAILS OF ARGUMENT 
Stipulations/Contracts 
Parties are bound by their stipulations unless they are timely 
relieved from them by motion to the Court and in the interest of 
justice and fair play. First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. 
Zundel and Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) and Klein v. Klein, 
544 P.2d 472 (1975) When a stipulation is clear, the trial court 
should enforce it. Higbev v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496 (Utah 1984) 
Appellee's position is that notwithstanding she freely and 
voluntarily entered into an unambiguous agreement, she is not bound 
by it because of the policy and regulations of the Social Security 
Administration. Appellee takes a similar position to that set forth 
in Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah 1990). 
The Maxwell case was a stipulated divorce where the parties 
agreed that the wife would be paid one-half (1/2) of the husband's 
military retirement benefits. The husband paid his former spouse 
benefits for awhile, but then discovered that the stipulation and 
order of the divorce court was contrary to the federal Uniformed 
Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) found in 10 U.S.C. 
§1408 (1983). The dispute involved whether or not the wife was 
entitled to gross or net benefits. 
The husband in Maxwell argued on appeal that the USFSPA 
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prohibits state courts from treating total or gross retired pay as 
marital property. The Maxwell Court reviewed this argument under 
the correction of error standard. The court held: 
"We determine that Otis cannot avoid the decree by now 
claiming mistake in entering into the stipulation. While a 
property settlement agreement is not binding upon a trial 
court in a divorce action, such agreement should be respected 
and given considerable weight in the trial court's 
determination of an equitable division of property 
"Further, stipulations are conclusive and binding on the 
parties, unless, upon timely notice and for good cause shown, 
relief is granted therefrom (Emphasis added.) 
"The appropriate procedure to provide such notice and obtain 
such relief from a judgment based on a mistakenly executed 
stipulation is to file a motion pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) seeking relief because of 'mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect within three 
months after the judgement, order of proceeding entered... 
"We reject Otis7attempt on appeal of the trial court's orders 
to show cause, which enforces the stipulated divorce decree, 
to bootstrap himself to a 'mistake' argument that should have 
been raised within three months after the original order was 
entered...." 
More than three (3) months has past since the entry of the 
court's order approving the stipulation in this case. For almost 
five (5) years, the parties relied on the stipulation. Appellant 
acted based on the stipulation and retired early so as to avoid the 
penalty contained in the stipulation and court order. 
The reasoning of the Maxwell case is clearly applicable to the 
facts of this case. Appellant should be entitled to rely on the 
orders of the court, especially when compliance with such orders 
profoundly affects Appellant's life and retirement plans. 
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Rule 60(b) is aimed at the very problem which now faces 
Appellant. If Appellee felt that the stipulation was a mistake 
because of the status of the law or the policies and regulations 
of the Social Security Administration, she should have complied 
with Rule 60(b) and brought a motion to set aside her agreement 
within three (3) months of its entry, not five (5) years. To wait 
until Appellant performs under the stipulation is neither just nor 
fair and therefore not proper grounds to set the stipulation aside. 
Appellee has argued that this is a mixed issue of support and 
property. However, this mix of issues was considered by the Utah 
Supreme court in Stetler v. Stetler, 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985) and 
held to be a valid mixture since both property and child support 
are matters subject to modification. This same argument was made 
in Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856 (Utah 1978) 
The Defendant in Holmgren attempted to avoid liability by 
claiming that the contracts which were sought to be enforced were 
void because they violated both public policy and statutory 
prohibitions. The Court, however, rejected this argument and held 
the Defendant to its various contracts. 
Setting Aside/ Relief from Stipulations 
Courts should look long and hard at a stipulation before 
deciding to set it aside. In Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 
1985), the Supreme Court held: 
"It is unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and filed 
with the court was entered into inadvertently. Further, 
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although the trial court has certain discretion in providing 
relief from a stipulation, if timely requested, see Klein v. 
Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 'ordinarily courts are bound by 
stipulations between parties " Emphasis added. 
The Dove court went on to say that a trial court must find 
that the party seeking to withdraw the stipulation did not 
understand or agree to the stipulation. In this case, the Plaintiff 
understood the stipulation and agreed to it. The stipulation is 
clear and was drafted by Plaintiffs attorney. Any questions about 
the drafting of the stipulation must be construed against 
Plaintiff. See Parks Enterprises Inc. v. New Century Realty, 652 
P.2d 918 (Utah 1982) 
In the Klein case cited in Dove, the Supreme Court held: 
"If there is any justification in law or equity for avoiding 
or repudiating a stipulation, and he timely does so, he is 
entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise, not." Emphasis 
added. 
In order for a party to withdraw a stipulation or for the 
court to grant relief from a stipulation, Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure must be followed. The rules stated: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered (3) 
fraud The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1),(2),(3) or (4), not more than 3 months 
after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or 
taken.." 
Even if the Court could set aside the judgment based in the 
stipulation, it must be done within three (3) months and upon such 
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terms as are just. It is not just to force Appellant into 
retirement, reduce his income and take from him the benefit of the 
stipulation without some just compensation. 
Mistake of Fact/Rescission 
A mistake of fact may be sufficient grounds to set aside a 
stipulation so long as the mistake of fact was not due to a lack 
or a failure to exercise due diligence and it could not have been 
avoided by the exercise of ordinary care. United Factors v. T.C. 
Associates Inc, 445 P.2d 766 (Utah 1968) Even then, it must be 
done within three (3) months of entry of the judgment or order. 
In order to claim avoidance of a stipulation and/or a contract 
for mutual mistake, the mistake must be as to a material factual 
matter which existed at the time of the making of the agreement. 
Mooney v. GR and Associates, 746 P.2d 1174 (Utah App. 1987) The 
Mooney court held: 
"A party may rescind a contract when, at the time the contract 
is made, the parties made a mutual mistake about a material 
fact, the existence of which is a basic assumption of the 
contract. If the parties harbor only mistaken expectations as 
to the course of future events and their assumptions as to the 
facts existing at the time of the contract are correct, 
rescission is not proper." 
Even if there was a mutual mistake as to a material fact, the 
stipulation is only voidable and not void and the court would be 
required to place the parties in their pre-contract positions 
rather than simply refuse to enforce the agreement. Robert 
Lanqston, LTD. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1987) 
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Social Security Act 
Plaintiff claims that the agreement between the parties is 
unenforceable because the regulations of the Social Security 
Administration, (see 20 C.F.R. §404.2035 and 2040) Copies of these 
regulations are attached in the addendum for the court's review. 
C.R.F. §404.2035 provides that a person who receives benefits 
on behalf of another person must use the benefits solely for the 
beneficiary and not for any other reason. This does not make the 
stipulation of the parties illegal. Under Utah Code §78-45-4, a 
woman has an obligation to support their minor children. This 
means that Plaintiff has an obligation to support these minor 
children as well as does Defendant. Under C.F.R. 404.2035, 
however, Plaintiff receives 100% of the necessary care expenses of 
the children; this includes Plaintiff's share as well as 
Defendant's share of the total cost of caring for the children. 
The stipulation is legal so long as the Plaintiff takes the 
Social Security funds and expends them totally for the use and 
benefit of the children. She must then take her share of the 
children's support and place it in a trust account pursuant to the 
stipulation of the parties. 
Social Security benefits can be legally used for the needs of 
the children while relieving Plaintiff of her duty to support the 
children. The stipulation simply provides that Plaintiff's share 
of the children's support is used to retire Defendant's lien 
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obligation, not the social security. 
Modification of the Stipulation 
Appellant requested the trial court to reform the stipulation 
and order so as to do equity between the parties. Divorce 
proceedings are matters of equity and the appellant court is free 
to consider the law and the facts when determining if an equitable 
order should be entered by the Court. Stetler v. Stetler, 713 P.2d 
699 (Utah 1985) A trial court has considerable discretion in 
adjusting the financial interests of parties in divorce. Cook v. 
Cook, 739 P.2d 90 (Utah App. 1987) Rule 60(b) requires the court 
to set aside its order "upon such terms as are just". 
In Hansen V. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975), the Supreme 
Court held that it has jurisdiction to modify property 
distributions upon proof of changed circumstances and conditions. 
The changed circumstances or conditions must be shown, 
however, prior to modification. Dixon v. Dixon, 240 P. 2d 1211 
(1954). Property settlements are not "sacrosanct" and are within 
the power of the court to modify. Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299 
(1980). 
The court has the equitable jurisdiction necessary to modify 
the decree in this case and to discharge the lien which was 
established in the 1985 decree and modified by agreement as to the 
method of payment in 1987. 
U 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Appellant should be reimbursed for his costs and attorney's 
fees since Appellee's refusal to comply with her agreement caused 
Appellant's costs and attorney's fees. Title 30 of Utah Code and 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide the legal 
basis for an award of fees. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The trial court should have enforced the stipulation of the 
parties which it approved in 1987. Defendant relied on the order 
of the court. It is not now just or fair to simply refuse to 
enforce the order of the court. There is sufficient legal basis to 
enforce the stipulation or to do what justice requires. 
Appellant requests this court to enforce the stipulation and 
award him his attorney's fees and cost. Alternatively, Appellant 
requests that this court enter an order deeming the $10,000.00 
property award to Appellee satisfied with an award of attorney's 
fees. The award of attorney's fees is equitable because under the 
1987 order of the trial court, Appellant would have received 
additional money from the trust account when Appellee was paid. 
Respectfully Submitted 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on this ^ 5 " day of May, 1993, four 
(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
WILFORD N. HANSEN JR. 
Attorney for Appellee 
Utah Bar #1352 
1172 East Highway 6, #7 
P.O. Box 67 
Payson, Utah, 84651-0067 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
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ADDENDUM 
This addendum contains copies of the following documents: 
A. Findings of Fact (January 7, 1987) 
B. Order Modifying Decree (January 7, 1987) 
C. Order on Order to Show Cause (August 13, 1992) 
D. Ruling on Defendant's Objection (November 5, 1992) 
E. Order on Defendant's Objection (November 30, 1992) 
F. Notice of Appeal (December 14, 1992) 
F. Trial Court Order on Petition to Modify 
(Entitled Order on Cross-Motions Related to Discovery) 
G. 20 C.F.R. §404.2035 & 2040 
H. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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BILL HANSEN, #1352 
CHRISTENSEN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Mountain View East Professional Plaza 
1172 East Highway 6, No. 7 
P.O. Box 67 
Payson, Utah 84651-0067 
Telephone: (801) 465-9288 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 




ORLO B. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
This matter came before Howard Maetani, Domestic Relations Commissioner of 
the above-entitled Court, for trial pursuant to Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce and for contempt, on Thursday, November 6, 1986, at 2 p.m. Both Plaintiff 
and Defendant were present and were represented by their respective counsel of 
record. The Stipulation of the parties was entered into the record and approved by 
both parties. Based thereon and good cause appearing therefore, the Court now makes 
and enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were divorced by decree of the above-entitled Court on July 
18, 1985. 
2. Defendant is presently in arrears pursuant to the property settlement 
portion of the Decree of Divorce, paragraph 4, for the August, September, and 
October, 1986 payments of $350 each, a total to date of $1,050. Said arrearages s h a l l be 






" " U 
FACT AND 
NS OF LAW 
3--~, Plaintiff has recorded her Trust Deed against the Defendant's property 
pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Decree of Divorce. 
4. Plaintiff agrees to deposit with Provo Abstract Company the documents 
necessary to release her Trust Deed and Notice of Interest to Defendant's real 
property in or near Springlake, Utah within three (3) days of the entry of the Order, 
to be delivered conditioned upon the Defendant's paying $31,500 to Plaintiff, the $350 
due November 30, 1986, and the $350 due December 31, 1986 under the original Decree 
and $350 monthly until the $31,500 is paid in full. 
5. Defendant agrees, in order to obtain Plaintiff's release of Trust Deed and 
Notice of Interest, 
a. To pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $31,500.00 cash on or before 
January 5, 1987. 
b. To pay the regular property settlement payments of $350 beginning 
November 30, 1986 and monthly thereafter as required pursuant to the original 
Decree of Divorce until Plaintiff shall receive the $31,500.00 set forth above. 
c. To pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $10,000.00 on or before September 
30, 1999 as follows: 
(1) The benefits which the children of the parties may receive as a 
result of Defendant's death or retirement shall be escrowed in a trust 
account at Zion's Bank, Spanish Fork Branch, and shall be disbursed to 
pay: 
(a) To the bank to pay fees of administering the account 
(b) To Plaintiff to pay $125 per month per child, child support 
when due 
(c) The balance to be held in an interest-bearing trust 
account, in the name of June Larson and credited for the payment of 
2 
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the property settlement payment of $10,000.00 until such time as the 
balance held equals the then-present value of $10,000.00 due October 
1, 1999, when calculated using Zion's Bank's prime rate at the time 
of the calculation. At the time the balance reaches the specified 
amount to satisfy the requirements set forth in this paragraph it 
shall be immediately disbursed to Plaintiff in satisfaction of the 
$10,000.00 property settlement obligation, the account will be closed 
and all of the benefits which the children are entitled to receive as a 
result of Defendant's death or retirement will be paid to Defendant 
or Defendant's estate. From that amount, Defendant will continue to 
pay his child support obligation of $125.00 per month per child. 
X ilU\ (2) It is Defendant's stated intent to retire on or before July, 1992.
 tt^%X-
If Defendant has not retired by that time or the Social Security payment!^ ^ ^ > 
is not available for any reason, Defendant will immediately contribute 
said escrow account an amount^that will generate $10,000 by 1999. 
(3) Defendant agrees to waive all rights to personally receive said 
Social Security payments intended for the benefit of the children until 
such time as the $10,000.00 obligation has been satisfied. Defendant 
shall timely sign any documents and perform any act that may be required 
to protect the above-described fund. 
(4) Defendant may pre-pay the present-day value of the said 
$10,000.00 obligation without penalty at any time prior to the due date or 
the date for performing any part of said obligation. 
(5) Default shall occur if the above-described account is not 
established by July, 1992, or if for any reason any monthly payment to 
w&& 
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said account is not made during the month whejn^due or, if in any month, 
a contribution is not made toward the property settlement. 
(6) In the event of failure to abide by provisions, Plaintiff may 
accelerate the balance then due and owing on the property settlement and 
proceed to collect the same, together with reasonable costs and attorney's 
fees. 
6. Defendant's action with respect to child custody is hereby dismissed. ~Hio • 
/Thi'Mr^n shall remain in the custody of the PlaJA*ifT. 
7. This Stipulation and Modification is entered into upon the representation 
of Defendant that he is in severe financial difficulty and is on the verge of bankruptcy 
if this agreement is not entered into. 
8. Each party claims to be entitled to various items of personal property 
awarded under the original Decree of Divorce which have not been delivered. 
9. Each party is to present to the other within five days of the date of 
signing and entry of the Order to Modify Decree, a list of those items of personal 
property claimed to have been awarded under the original Decree of Divorce which 
have not been delivered. Each party is ordered not to dispose of any personal 
property of the other or in which the other party claims an interest and within ten 
days after receiving the list requested American Towing will pick up said items at each 
parties residence and will transport the items to each parties residence. The parteis 
will split the cost of towing. 
10. Plaintiff agrees to waive any right to hay which she has under paragraph 
6 of the original Decree of Divorce. 
11. Defendant shall be in default under the Agreement of the parties if any 
condition is not performed when required or any of the obligations set forth above are 
not paid when due. In the event of a default, the Agreement of the parties shall be 
4 
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null and void and the parties shall revert to the provisions set forth in the original 
Decree of Divorce regarding the property settlement. 
12. Each party is to bear his or her own costs and attorney's fees in this 
particular matter. 
13. Neither party presented evidence as to other matters contained in 
Defendant's Petition or Plaintiff's Answer thereto, the parties appearing to have 
reso lved -between Ihiiimlvcs—tire oiher rTOTTCTs—including child custody,—vnitntion,^ 
C h i l d r e n ^ p r o p e r t y , rf>mrc\] t n v p ? i n H h f t ^ . 
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters 
its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled matter. 
2. The Defendant's severe financial circumstances constitute a material 
change of circumstances which justify a modification in the property settlement portion 
of the Decree of Divorce. 
1. The frhilrlrrn ?hn11 remain in the custody of the Plaintiff. 
^ . The provisions of the Stipulation of the parties as entered into the record 
and as set forth in the Findings of Fact above are hereby approved as being 
reasonable and are to be incorporated in an Order to Modify Decree of Divorce. All 
other matters are hereby dismissed. 
22 
DATED this day of December, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
MARK ROBINSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER 
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Bill Hansen, #1352 
CHRISTENSEN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Mountain View East Professional Plaza 
1172 East Highway 6, Nos. 7 & 19 
P.O. Box 67 
Payson, Utah 84651-0067 
Telephone: (801) 465-9288 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUNE LARSON, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
YS. 
Civil No. 68,661 
ORLO B. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
This matter came before Howard Maetani, Domestic Relations Commissioner of 
the above-entitled Court, for trial pursuant to Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce and for contempt, on Thursday, November 6, 1986, at 2 p.m. Both Plaintiff 
and Defendant were present and were represented by their respective counsel of 
record. The Stipulation of the parties was entered into the record and approved by 
both parties. The Court has made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. Based thereon and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. The Decree of Divorce entered in the above-entitled Court on July 18, 
1985 is modified as set forth herein. 
2. Plaintiff is ordered to deposit with Provo Abstract Company the documents 
necessary to release her Trust Deed and Notice of Interest to Defendant's real 
property in or near Springlake, Utah, within three (3) days of the entry of this Order, 
to be delivered conditioned upon the Defendant's paying $31,500 to Plaintiff, the $350 
1 
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due November 30, 1986, and the $350 due December 31, 1986 under the original Decree 
and $350 monthly until the $31,500 is paid in full. 
3. It is ordered that Defendant, in order to obtain Plaintiff's release of Trust 
Deed and Notice of Interest, 
a. Pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $31,500.00 cash on or before January 
5, 1987. 
b. Pay the regular property settlement payments of $350 beginning 
November 30, 1986 and monthly thereafter as required pursuant to the original 
Decree of Divorce until Plaintiff shall receive the $31,500.00 set forth above. 
c. Pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $10,000.00 on or before September 
30, 1999 as follows: 
(1) The benefits which the children of the parties may receive as a 
result of Defendant's death or retirement are ordered escrowed in a trust 
account at Zion's Bank, Spanish Fork Branch, and are ordered disbursed to 
pay: 
(a) To the bank to pay fees of administering the account 
(b) To Plaintiff to pay $125 per month per child, child support 
when due 
(c) The balance is ordered held in an interest-bearing trust 
account, in the name of June Larson and credited for the 
payment of the property settlement payment of $10,000.00 
until such time as the balance held equals the then-present 
value of $10,000.00 due October 1, 1999, when calculated using 
Zion's Bank's prime rate at the time of the calculation. At the 
time the balance reaches the specified amount to satisfy the 
requirements set forth in this paragraph it is ordered 
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immediately disbursed to Plaintiff in satisfaction of the 
$10,000.00 property settlement obligation, the account will be 
closed and all of the benefits which the children are entitled to 
receive as a result of Defendant's death or retirement will be 
paid to Defendant or Defendant's estate. From that amount, 
Defendant will continue to pay his child support obligation of 
$125.00 per month per child. 
(2) If Defendant has not retired by July, 1992, or the Social 
Security payment is not available for any reason, Defendant is ordered to 
immediately contribute to said escrow account an amount that will 
generate $10,000 by 1999. 
(3) Defendant shall waive all rights to personally receive said 
Social Security payments intended for the benefit of the children until 
such time as the $10,000.00 obligation has been satisfied. Defendant 
shall timely sign any documents and perform any act that may be required 
to protect the above-described fund. 
(4) Defendant may pre-pay the present-day value of the said 
$10,000.00 obligation without penalty at any time prior to the due date or 
the date for performing any part of said obligation. 
(5) Default shall occur if the above-described account is not 
established by July, 1992, or if for any reason any monthly payment to 
said account is not made during the month when due or, if in any month, 
a contribution is not made toward the property settlement. 
(6) In the event of failure to abide by provisions, Plaintiff may 
accelerate the balance then due and owing on the property settlement and 
3 
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proceed to collect the same, together with reasonable costs and attorney's 
fees. 
4. It is ordered that Plaintiff retain custody of the minor children of the 
parties, subject to Defendant's rights of visitation as specified in the original Decree 
of Divorce. 
5. Each party is ordered to present to the other within five days of the date 
of signing and entry of this Order to Modify Decree, a list of those items of personal 
property claimed to have been awarded under the original Decree of Divorce which 
have not been delivered. Each party is ordered not to dispose of any personal 
property of the other or in which the other party claims an interest and within ten 
days after receiving the list requested American Towing will pick up said items at each 
party's residence and will transport the items to each party's residence. The parties 
will split the cost of towing. 
6. Paragraph 6 of the original Decree of Divorce is hereby modified to 
eliminate the requirement that Defendant provide Plaintiff any further hay. 
7. Defendant shall be in default under the Agreement of the parties if any 
condition is not performed when required or any of the obligations set forth above are 
not paid when due. In the event of a default, the Agreement of the parties shall be 
null and void and the parties shall revert to the provisions set forth in the original 
Decree of Divorce regarding the property settlement. 
8. Each party is to bear his or her own costs and attorney's fees in this 
particular matter. 
9. All other matters contained in Defendant's Petition or Plaintiff's answer 
thereto, including child custody, visitation, children's property, records, taxes, and hay 




DATED this "7 day of ] 2 e « n $ e ? T 9 8 ^ 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
/ ^ DOMESTIC RE£ATI6KS COMMISSIONER 
MARK F. ROBINSON 
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WILFORD N. HANSEN, JR., P:C 
Bill Hansen, #1352 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mountain View East Professional Plaza 
1172 East Highway 6, Suite 7 
Post Office Box 67 
Payson, Utah 84651-0067 
Telephone: (801) 465-9288 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUNE LARSON, nka JUNE BECKMAN, 
Plaintiff, ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
vs. Howard H. Maetani, Commissioner 
ORLO B. LARSON, Civil No. 68,661 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Honorable Howard H. Maetani, Domestic Relations 
Commissioner of the above-entitled Court pursuant to Defendant's Order to Show Cause 
and Plaintifrs Counter Order to Show Cause this 28th day of July, 1992, at the hour of 
1:30 p.m. Plaintiff was present and was represented by Bill Hansen. Defendant was 
present and was represented by Marilyn Moody Brown. Counsel conferred with 
Commissioner Maetani in chambers regarding the applicable law pertaining to trust 
accounts for child support and the use of the minor childrens' social security monies to 
discharge personal obligations of the Defendant. Based thereon, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. An Order modifying the Decree of Divorce was entered on January 7, 1987. 
2. Pursuant to said Order, upon Defendant's retirement, any social security 
1 
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benefits to be received by the parties' minor children would be credited towards 
Defendant's child support obligation. 
3. The children, Karalee Larson and Oralee Larson, receive social security 
benefits of $312.00 each per month on the account of Leonard Beckman, their step-
father. 
4. Said children received $470.00 each per month for the months of June and 
July, 1992, on the combined account of Mr. Beckman and Defendant, a difference of 
$158.00 per month pCT child. 
5. It is ordered that said sum is the exclusive property of each of the 
children, and that Defendant's child support obligation for said children during those 
months is satisfied. 
6. It is further ordered that the childrcns' social security benefits are not 
required to be placed in a trust account, but may be paid directly to the children. 
7. Furthermore, it is ordered that said funds arc not lawfully available to 
discharge Defendant's personal indebtedness to the Plaintiff. 
8. Paragraph 3c(l) of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce dated January 
7, 1987, is hereby stricken. 
9. Any further modification of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce with 
regard to the payment provisions of the $10,000.00 obligation set forth in paragraph 3c 
must be agreed to by the parties or re-litigated. 
30 
/3 day of DATED this '->  f August, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MARILYN Mj60DY BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant 
jk. 
HOWARD H. MAETANI 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 





RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION TO RULING OF 
COURT COMMISSIONER, 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
ENFORCE DECREE OF 
MODIFICATION, TO SET ASIDE 
COMMISSIONER'S RULING & FOR 
OTHER RELIEF 
CASE NO. 68661 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on September 30th, 1992 for oral argument on 
Defendant's Objection to the Ruling of the Court Commissioner. Plaintiff was present and 
was represented by Bill Hansen, Esq. Defendant was present and was represented by C. 
Robert Collins, Esq. 
The Court took the matter under advisement. The Court having been fully advised in 
the premises now enters its decision: 
I. 
COMMISSIONER'S RULING 
At issue before the Court is a provision in the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce. 
The Modification order provides that upon retirement or death of the defendant, the social 
security benefits which would accrue the minor children of the parties be held in an escrow 
account. Defendant was to be relieved of additional child support obligation. It was 
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anticipated that plaintiff would be able to withdraw from the escrow account the amount of 
defendant's child support obligation. The remaining funds were to be left in the escrow 
account to accumulate over a seven year period. At the end of the seven year period, the 
plaintiff would be paid $10,000.00 out of the escrow account and the remaining funds were 
to be the defendants. The above provision was to go into effect by July, 1992, or defendant 
was foreclosed from availing himself of this provision.1 
On or about June 24, 1992, defendant filed with the Court an Order to Show Cause 
against the plaintiff seeking enforcement of the above described provision in the modification 
decree. On July 28, 1992, this matter came before the Court Commissioner for a hearing on 
the Order to Show Cause. The Court Commissioner ruled 1) that the Court would not 
approve of the provision at that time due to additional information concerning the use of 
social security benefits, 2) that the order to show cause was stricken, and 3) that the social 
security payments would be subtracted from defendant's support obligation. All other issues 
were left for the parties to either work out or relitigate in the future. The Court 
Commissioner did not rule on the payment of the $10,000.00 dollars. 
On or around August 7, 1992, Defendant filed an Objection to Ruling of Court 
*The Court also notes that the original divorce decree also provides that social security 
payments for the support of the minor children in excess of the child support award would 
reduce the amount of indebtedness on the property settlement between the parties. See 
Decree of Divorce, 1 3, Dated July 18, 1985. 
2 
3.3 
Commissioner Defendant's objection was supported by a Motion to Enforce Decree of 
Modification, Set Aside Commissioner's Ruling, and for Other Relief. 
n. 
OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S RULINQ 
The Court affirms the Ruling of the Court Commissioner. At the July 28th hearing, 
the Court Commissioner refused to approve or give effect to the provision in question due to 
federal restrictions on the use of social security support funds. This Court agrees with the 
Commissioner's reasoning. A child's Social Security benefit may not be used to discharge a 
parent's personal debt not related to the support of the child. Fauver v. Hansen. 803 P.2d 
1275, 1278 (Utah App. 1990). "Utah Courts have long held that the right to receive child 
support is an unalienable right, belonging to the child, and cannot be bartered away by the 
child's parent or parents." Id. 
The Social Security regulations dealing with payments made to minor children of 
retired employees is in line with Utah's approach to child support. 20 CFR Ch. Ill § 
404.2035 states that a representative payee, (i.e. guardian or parent of minor child in this 
case) "has the responsibility to use the payments he or she receives only for the use and 
benefit of the beneficiary . . . " Use of social security benefits to retire a debt of defendant 
does not meet the mandate of this section and will not be enforced by this court. 
Additionally, neither party has the power to bargain away a right belonging exclusively to the 




OTHER MOTIONS OF DEFENDANT 
In addition to filing an objection to the Court Commissioner's ruling, defendant also 
filed a motion to enforce the modification decree, to set aside the Court Commissioner's 
ruling and other relief. These motions are not properly before the Court. The Court has 
already considered defendant's objection to the Court Commissioner's ruling. The Court will 
not entertain any matter outside the scope of an objection to the Court Commissioner's 
ruling. Defendant's motions to enforce the modification decree and to set aside the Court 
Commissioner's ruling are hereby denied. 
Dated, at Provo, this Jj^_ day of November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
4udge Lynn W. Davfs 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Uiah County, fct*U» «f Utah 
CARiviA B. SMITH, Clsrk 
Deputy 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah State Bar #5455 
405 East State Road 
P.O. Box 243 
American Fork, UT 84003 
(801) 756-0554 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUNE LARSON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ORLO LASON, ] 
Defendant. 
| ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
) AND OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S | RULING 
| Case No. 68661 
i •' • Judge Lynn W. Davis 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the undersigned 
judge of the above entitled Court for oral argument on September 
30, 1992, Plaintiff appearing with her attorney, Bill Hansen, 
Defendant appearing with his attorney, C. ROBERT COLLINS, the Court 
having taken this matter under advisement, having reviewed the 
files and records herein, having made its ruling under date of 
November 5, 1992, and deeming itself fully advised, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner's 
ruling and subsequent Order on Order to Show Cause filed on or 
about August 13, 1992, shall be and is hereby confirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court declines to rule on 
balance of Defendant's motions for and upon the grounds that the 
36 
court believes that the other matters are not properly before the 
court. 
^ A 
___, £ day of November, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
_ _ ^ 
This is to certify that on this / / day of November 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Bill Hansen 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 67 
Payson, UT 84651 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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C* ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah State Bar #5455 
405 East State Road 
P.O. Box 243 
American Fork, UT 84003 
(801) 756-0554 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUNE LARSON, ] 
Plaintiff & Appellee, 
vs. 
ORLO LARSON, 
Defendant & Appellant. 
Case No. 68,661 
i NOTICE OF APPEAL 
i Judge Lynn Davis 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendant and Appellant Orlo 
Larson, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final judgment of 
the Honorable Judge Lynn Davis, entered in this matter on November 
30, 1992, and entitled Order on Defendant's Motion and Objection to 
Commissioner's Ruling. The appeal is taken from the entire order. 
Dated this 9th day of December, 1992. 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
FlLtLMW 
4™ DISTRICT COURT 
STATE 0 r irR:i 
DEC 14 2 ^ m ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This hereby certifies that on the jL/ day of December, 1992, 
the undersigned mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to: 
Bill Hansen 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 67 
Payson, Utah, 84651 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah State Bar #5455 
405 East State Road 
P.O. Box 243 
American Fork, UT 84003 
(801) 756-0554 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 









ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS 
I RELATED TO DISCOVERY ISSUES 
i Case No. 68661 
i Commissioner Howard Maetani 
THIS MATTER having come on regular before the undersigned 
commissioner of the above entitled Court on May 4, 1993, for oral 
arguments on Defendant's Motion to Compel and upon Plaintiff's 
Motion for Protective Order, Defendant appearing with his attorney 
of record, Plaintiff not appearing, but being represented by her 
attorney of record, the Court having heard the arguments of 
counsel, having reviewed the files and records herein and deeming 
itself fully advised, makes the following: 
1. There is currently pending in the Court of Appeals an 
appeal related to whether or not the Court should enforcement a 
prior stipulation of the parties related to a $10,000 property lien 
and social security. The Court has previously ruled that the 
provision is illegal and has refused to enforce it. Defendant has 
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appealed the enforceability of the stipulation. 
2. The Defendant has also filed a petition to modify the 
original order of this court related to the $10,000 property lien 
based on equity and his position that the Court would not consider 
his equitable arguments when the issue of the enforceability of the 
lien provision was before the Court because of statements by the 
court that this issue was not properly before the court at that 
time. 
3. The subject matter of the appeal and the petition for 
modification is the same, however, the issues are difference; i.e. 
illegality of the provision verse equitable relief to deem the 
$10,000 satisfied though not paid. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over the first issue and this court has jurisdiction 
over the second. 
4. In connection with the petition to modify, Defendant has 
served interrogatories and requests for documents on Plaintiff. 
5. When Plaintiff did not answered Defendant's discovery, he 
filed a motion to compel. Plaintiff responded by answering a few of 
the interrogatories, but objected to most as burdensome and 
irrelevant. 
6. The Court's inclination is to stay the petition to modify 
until a decision from the Court of Appeals is made, however, 
Plaintiff requested the Court not to do so and that the petition to 
modify proceed. 
7. The Court reviewed the interrogatories and requests for 
documents and finds that they are not burdensome and are relevant 
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to the petition to modify which is before this court. 
8. The parties stipulated that Plaintiff may have an 
additional 30 days to respond to the requested discovery. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiff shall answer the requested interrogatories and 
produce the requested documents on or before June 4, 1993. 
2. The Court reserves the right on its own motion to stay 
the petition to modify at the time of pre-trial hearing after 
review of the status of the appeal at that time. 
3. The issues of attorney shall be reserved. 
4. The motion for protective order is denied 
5. The motion to compel is granted. 
Dated this ff day of May, 1993. 
^Commissioners~Tfoward Maetani 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on this \£ day of May, 1993 a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
Mountain View East Professional Plaza 
1172 East Hwy. 6, Suite 7 
P.O. Box 67 
Payson, UT 84651-0067 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
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§ 404.2035 20 CFR Ch. Ill (4-1-91 Edition) Social Security Administration, HHS 
If he or she objects to either proposed 
*itlon, the person may— 
(1) Review the evidence upon which 
.he proposed actions will be based; and 
(2) Submit any additional evidence 
egarding the proposed actions. 
(b) If the person objects to the pro-
Dosed actions, we will review our pro-
ised determinations and consider any 
idditlonal information given to us. We 
vill then issue our determinations. If 
he person is dissatisfied with* either 
letermination, he or she may request 
i reconsideration. 
(c) If the person does not object to 
he proposed actions, we will issue our 
^terminations. If the person is dlssat-
sfled with either determination, he or 
he may request a reconsideration. 
47 FR 30472. July 14. 1982; 47 PR 32936. 
uly 30, 1982] 
404.2035 lteHpoitMibilitkH of a represent-
ative payee. 
A representative payee has a respon-
ibility to— 
(a) Use the payments he or she re-
eives only for the use and benefit of 
he beneficiary in a manner and for 
he purposes he or she determines. 
~<der the guidelines in this subpart, 
J be in the best interests of the bene-
iciary; 
(b) Notify us of any event that will 
ffect the amount of benefits the ben-
ficiary receives or the right of the 
eneficiary to receive benefits; 
(c) Submit to us, upon our request, a 
itten report accounting for the ben-
fits received; and 
(d) Notify us of any change in his or 
er circumstances that would affect 
erformance of the payee responslbil-
les. 
404.2040 Use of benefit payments. 
*a) Current maintenance. (1) We will 
msider that payments we certify to a 
jpresentative payee have been used 
>r the use and benefit of the benefici-
-y if they are used for the benefi-
ary's current maintenance. Current 
aintenance includes cost incurred in 
Gaining food, shelter, clothing, medi-
il care, and personal comfort items. 
Example: An aged beneficiary Is entitled 
a monthly Social Security benefit of 
00. Her son. who Is her payee, disburses 
r benefits in the following manner: 
Rent and utilities $201 
Medical • IS 
Food « 
Clothing (coat) SS 
Savings 30 
Miscellaneous 30 
The above expenditures would repre-
sent proper disbursements on behalf 
of the beneficiary. 
(2> Notwithstanding the provisions 
of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, if i 
beneficiary Is a member of an Aid to 
Families With Dependent Children 
(APDC) assistance unit, we do not con-
sider it inappropriate for a representa-
tive payee to make the benefit pay-
ments available to the APDC assist-
ance unit. 
(b) Institutional care. If a benefld-
ary is receiving care in a Federal 
State, or private institution because of 
mental or physical incapacity, current 
maintenance includes the customary 
charges made by the institution, as 
well as expenditures for those items 
which will aid in the beneficiary's re-
covery or release from the institution 
or expenses for personal needs which 
will improve the beneficiary's condi-
tions while in the institution. 
Example: An institutionalized beneficiary 
is entitled to a monthly Social Security ben-
efit of $320. The institution charges $700 i 
month for room and board. The benefi-
ciary's brother, who is the payee, learns the 
beneficiary needs new shoes and does not 
have any funds to purchase miscellaneous 
Items at the institution's canteen. 
The payee takes his brother to town and 
buys him a pair of shoes for $29. He alio 
takes the beneficiary to see a movie which 
costs $3. When they return to the instltu 
tlon, the payee gives his brother $3 to be 
used at the canteen. 
Although the payee normally withholds 
only $25 a month from Social Security bene-
fit for the beneficiary's personal needs, ths 
month the payee deducted the above ex-
penditures and paid the institution $10 lea 
than he usually pays. 
The above expenditures represent whit 
we would consider to be proper expendi-
tures for current maintenance. 
(c) Support of legal dependents. If 
the current maintenance needs of the 
beneficiary are met, the payee may 
use part of the payments for the sup-
port of the beneficiary's legally de-
pendent spouse, child, and/or parent. 
Example: A disabled beneficiary receives a 
Veterans Administration (VA) benefit of 
$325 and a Social Security benefit of $525. 
The beneficiary resides in a VA hospital and 
his VA benefits are sufficient to provide for 
all of his needs; I.e.. cost of care and person-
al needs. The beneficiary's legal depend-
ents—his wife and two children—have a 
total Income of $250 per month in Social Se-
curity benefits. However, they have ex* 
penses of approximately $450 per month. 
Because the VA benefits are sufficient tq 
meet the beneficiary's needs, It would be ap-
propriate to use part of his Social Security 
benefits to support his dependents. 
(d) Claims of creditors. A payee may 
not be required to use benefit pay-
ments to satisfy a debt of the benefici-
ary, if the debt arose prior to the first 
month for which payments are certi-
fied to a payee. If the debt arose prior 
to this time, a payee may satisfy it 
only if the current and reasonably 
foreseeable needs of the beneficiary 
are met. 
Example: A retroactive Social Security 
check in the amount of $1,640, representing 
benefits due for July 1080 through January 
1081. was Issued on behalf of the beneficiary 
to the beneficiary's aunt who is the repre-
sentative payee. The check was certified in 
February 1981. 
The nursing home, where the beneficiary 
resides, submitted a bill for $1,139 to the 
payee for maintenance expenses the benefi-
ciary Incurred during the period from June 
1980 through November 1980. (Maintenance 
charges for December 1980 through Febru-
ary 1981 had previously been paid.) 
Because the benefits were not required for 
the beneficiary's current maintenance, the 
payee had previously saved over $500 for 
the beneficiary and the beneficiary had no 
foreseeable needs which would require large 
disbursement, the expenditure for the 
maintenance charges would be consistent 
with our guidelines. 
(47 FR 30472. July 14. 1982, as amended at 
$4 FR 35483. Aug. 28. 1989) 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(h) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal rep-
resentative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen-
dent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
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